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Note 
 
Lighten Up: Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs  
 
Allison E. Don 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Marijuana has been used by millions of people worldwide for 
thousands of years.1 Its durability made it a popular material for clothing, 
rope and other commercial items. It was a dietary and medicinal staple in 
early civilizations.2  George Washington, Thomas Jefferson and Ben 
Franklin all cultivated, utilized and encouraged the production of 
marijuana.3 Yet somehow, marijuana went from being a legal source of 
payment for taxes4 to a global problem warranting an international treaty 
banning its use.5 By the time the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 
was signed in 1961, marijuana had become illegal in most countries 
throughout the world.6 
In 2012, despite being illegal in the United States at the federal 
level, Colorado and Washington’s constituents passed a proposition that 
would permit the use of marijuana for recreational purposes within their 
 
 University of Minnesota Law School, J.D. candidate 2015; Temple University, B.A. 
2008. I would like to dedicate this Note to my fiancé, James Reyerson, with whom I share 
all my success. His encouragement and support through the ups and downs made this Note 
possible. I’d like to thank the editors and staff on the Minnesota Journal of International 
Law for their outstanding editorial contributions. 
 1. DAVID E. NEWTON, MARIJUANA preface at xiii (2013); see also Dennis S. 
Newitt, The Medical Use of Marijuana: State Legislation, Judicial Interpretation and 
Federal Drug Laws, 4 J. LEGAL ADVOC. & PRAC. 156, 156 (2002) (“The marijuana plant 
has been cultivated practically from the dawn of recorded history, at least 5000 years.”). 
 2. See NEWTON, supra note 1, at 12–41 (explaining the importance of marijuana 
throughout early cultures). For an explanation of how marijuana can be used to produce 
industrial materials see infra note 9. 
 3. See NEWTON, supra note 1, at 32–33 (describing George Washington’s, Thomas 
Jefferson’s and Ben Franklin’s involvement in the production and use of marijuana); see 
also MARTIN A. LEE, SMOKE SIGNALS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF MARIJUANA 16–19 (2012) 
(recounting George Washington’s and Thomas Jefferson’s encouragement of the growth 
of marijuana); LARRY SLOMAN, REEFER MADNESS: THE HISTORY OF MARIJUANA IN 
AMERICA 21 (1979) (quoting George Washington’s diary entries regarding his cultivation 
of marijuana plants). 
 4. NEWTON, supra note 1, at 32 (“[F]or a period of more than two centuries after 
the establishment of the Jamestown and Massachusetts Bay settlements, hemp was so 
widely grown and used that it was legal tender for payment of taxes and fines.”).   
 5. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs art. 28, ¶ 3, Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407, 
570 U.N.T.S. 151 [hereinafter Single Convention] (“The Parties shall adopt such measures 
as may be necessary to prevent the misuse of, and illicit traffic in, the leaves of the 
cannabis plant.”). 
 6. See Harry G. Levine, The Secret of Worldwide Drug Prohibition: The Varieties 
and Uses of Drug Prohibition, 7 INDEP. REV. 165, 168 (2002) (describing the adoption of 
global drug prohibition over the course of the last eight decades). 
 state lines.7 The months following were filled with questions. What 
would the Obama administration’s response be? Would the rest of the 
country follow suit? How would this affect enforcement of federal laws? 
Yet little was said publicly about the potential ramifications the new 
legislation would have on the United States’ obligations under the Single 
Convention.  
This Note attempts to identify the obligations imposed by the Single 
Convention and analyze what affects Colorado and Washington’s new 
legislation may have on those obligations while considering an 
international shift in attitude regarding recreational marijuana. Part I 
provides an overview of the worldwide history and evolution of 
marijuana and marijuana legislation including the Single Convention. 
Part II considers the relationship between the United States and the 
Single Convention in light of the liberal shift in marijuana laws within 
Colorado and Washington. This Part argues that the Single Convention 
should be amended to permit parties to freely legislate marijuana.  
Support is then offered for legalizing marijuana at the federal level within 
the United States. This Note concludes that the Single Convention should 
be amended to allow states to determine how marijuana should be used 
within their territories without fear of international ramifications and that 
following such amendment, the United States should allow for the 
recreational use of marijuana at the federal level.  
A Custody Battle: How the United States Teamed Up With the 
World in a Fight Against the Single Convention over Marijuana 
Marijuana’s Origins 
The use of marijuana by societies dates back thousands of years to 
what is now modern day Taipei, Taiwan.8 It was at the site of what is 
now Taiwan’s capital that hemp9 fibers were discovered on excavated 
pottery.10 Analysis of those fibers showed that the marijuana was 12,000 
 
 7. Brian A. Shactman, Washington State, Colorado Vote Yes to Legalizing 
Marijuana, CNBC (Nov. 7, 2012, 1:58 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/49729596. 
 8. NEWTON, supra note 1, at 3. 
 9. Hemp and what modern day society considers “marijuana” are derived from the 
same plant, Cannabis sativa. See id. at 10; Itai Danovitch, Sorting Through the Science on 
Marijuana: Facts, Fallacies, and Implications for Legalization, 43 McGeorge L. Rev. 91, 
93 (2012). The plant can grow between three and twenty feet tall, with a main stalk that 
can be up to two inches thick. NEWTON, supra note 1, at 10. When grown for hemp fibers, 
the plant is harvested before it has a chance to flower. Id. at 10–11. It can then be used to 
produce a variety of materials, including clothes, rope, netting and paper. Id. at 10. In 
contrast, marijuana is harvested later, after the plant has had time to fully mature and 
flower. KARA C. HAYNES ET AL., UNIV. OF VERMONT, VERMONT LEGISLATIVE 
RESEARCH SHOP 2 (2008) available at 
http://www.uvm.edu/~vlrs/Agriculture/industrialhemp.pdf. The main difference between 
hemp and marijuana is the level of tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) the plants produce.  
NEWTON, supra note 1, at 11. THC is the chemical responsible for the psychoactive 
effects associated with marijuana. Danovitch, supra, at 93. When found in nature, hemp 
contains approximately 0.3–1.0% THC. HAYNES ET AL., supra, at 2. By contrast, 
marijuana has been bred to contain upwards of 20% THC.  NEWTON, supra note 1, at 11. 
For purposes of this Note, “hemp” will be used to refer to industrial uses of the plant while 
“marijuana” will be used to refer to the physical plant and all other uses. 
 10. NEWTON, supra note 1, at 3.  
  
years old.11 Written documents dating back to the 16th century B.C. and 
containing instructions for both the planting and harvesting of marijuana 
were also found, suggesting that marijuana was a vital part of ancient 
Chinese culture.12 
From China, marijuana spread to India, Africa, South America, 
Mexico and Europe.13 Europeans relied heavily on the plant and its 
presence can be found throughout many facets of European history.14 For 
example, marijuana became so important within the shipping industry, 
which relied on hemp to produce sails and ropes, that around 1533, King 
Henry VIII enacted a law requiring English farmers to grow marijuana on 
their land.15 This law was subsequently renewed by Queen Elizabeth, 
solidifying marijuana’s position within the European economy.16 
Marijuana became such a mainstay in the culture, that once the British 
established themselves in what is now the United States, they began 
requiring that Jamestown colonists grow marijuana in order to 
supplement the crops already flourishing in Great Britain.17 By 1762, the 
colonies themselves began imposing their own penalties on farmers who 
didn’t produce marijuana.18  
Marijuana Legislation in the United States 
The Start of a Drug War 
The Scythians were among the earliest known users of marijuana for 
recreational purposes.19 “In the fifth century B.C., the Greek historian 
Herodotus observed that the Scythians would hurl hemp seeds onto 
heated stones and then inhale the vapor to become intoxicated.”20 Other 
early instances of marijuana being used for its psychoactive properties 
can be found in China, India and Africa.21 In America, the use of 
recreational marijuana can be attributed to a combination of minority 
groups who introduced the practice of smoking marijuana for recreational 
purposes to the United States upon their immigration at the turn of the 
 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 13–14. 
 13. Joseph E. Kohler, The Highs and Lows of Marijuana Legislation in the United 
States, 1 OHIO N.U. INTRAMURAL L. REV. 60, 61 (1970–71). 
 14. See NEWTON, supra note 1, at 26 (explaining that the Magna Carta and 
Gutenberg’s first Bible were both printed on paper made from hemp). 
 15. See LEE, supra note 3, at 16; NEWTON, supra note 1, at 28. 
 16. See LEE, supra note 3, at 16; NEWTON, supra note 1, at 28. 
 17. See NEWTON, supra note 1, at 30 (explaining that in 1619 the Virginia Company 
required that Jamestown colonists grow 100 marijuana plants and that the governor 
establish another 5,000 marijuana plants). 
 18. See SLOMAN, supra note 3, at 21 (explaining that due to the use of hemp for 
clothes and paper, Virginia enacted penalties for colonists who didn’t produce marijuana). 
 19. NEWTON, supra note 1, at 19 (explaining that the Scythians lived in the southern 
part of modern day Russia). 
 20. SLOMAN, supra note 3, at 22; see also NEWTON, supra note 1, at 19. 
 21. See NEWTON, supra note 1, at 16–17, 21–22 (describing how the early Chinese 
pharmacopoeia, Pen Ching, provided a description of the hallucinogenic effects of 
marijuana; that Hindu texts, known as the Vedas, refer to the psychoactive effects 
marijuana possesses; and that in Africa, tribesmen would gather in groups, throw 
marijuana plants onto coals and breath in the fumes together). 
 century.22  
States slowly began legislating against marijuana as an indirect 
means of targeting the minority immigrants attempting to establish 
themselves within their borders.23 States with borders to Mexico began to 
see an influx of Mexican immigrants as a result of the Mexican 
revolution in the early 1900s.24 The Mexican immigrants traditionally 
used marijuana for its psychoactive properties and brought this tradition 
with them.25 The influx of Mexican immigrants spawned animosity 
within the southern states and marijuana posed the perfect means of 
targeting the Mexican population.26 In 1915, California became the first 
U.S. state to prohibit marijuana. By 1930, sixteen additional states had 
enacted marijuana laws in some form.27  
During this time, the federal government was initially too busy 
dealing with prohibition to be bothered with marijuana. The prohibition, 
which was spearheaded by Harry Anslinger, was nonetheless failing to 
gain public support and eventually Anslinger began looking for a new pet 
project.28 Marijuana became Anslinger’s new cause and in 1937, under 
his urging, the first federal legislation against marijuana, the Marijuana 
Tax Act, was enacted by Congress and imposed mandatory prison terms 
for both the possession and the sale of marijuana.29  
In 1970, the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) broke down all 
controlled substances into five categories, designated as Schedules I-V, 
based on the substances’ dangers and/or benefits.30 In an effort to better 
understand marijuana and place it into a schedule, Congress formed the 
National Commission on Marihuana31 and Drug Abuse and tasked the 
 
 22. See SLOMAN, supra note 3, at 29 (describing the combination of Mexican and 
black farm workers who smoked marijuana solely for recreational purposes).  
 23. See LEE, supra note 3, at 42 (explaining that in the early 1900s the federal 
government didn’t see a problem with marijuana, but southern states, including California 
and Texas, made marijuana illegal). 
 24. Id. at 41. 
 25. Richard J. Bonnie & Charles H. Whitebread, II, The Forbidden Fruit and the 
Tree of Knowledge: An Inquiry into the Legal History of American Marijuana Prohibition, 
56 VA. L. REV. 971, 1011–12 (1970). 
 26. James B. Slaughter, Marijuana Prohibition in the United States: History and 
Analysis of a Failed Policy, 21 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 417, 419 (1987–88) 
(describing how marijuana legislation was the result of racism towards Mexican 
immigrants). 
 27. Bonnie & Whitebread, supra note 25, at 1012. 
 28. See SLOMAN, supra note 3, at 35 (explaining that in 1928, Anslinger was pushing 
for “penalties of a fine not less than $1,000 and imprisonment of not less than six months” 
for any involvement with liquor, but that by 1929 he was admitting that prohibition lacked 
public support). 
 29. Kohler, supra note 13, at 64–66 (explaining that minimum sentences for a first 
offense of possession of marijuana were between two and ten years, while minimum 
sentences for a first offense of selling marijuana were between five and twenty years). But 
see Kathleen Auerhahn, The Split Labor Market and the Origins of Antidrug Legislation in 
the United States, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 411, 435 (1999) (“[I]t seems inherently 
reductionist to theorize that a single individual or organization could single-handedly 
create a moral panic resulting in the passage of federal legislation.”) (emphasis in 
original). 
 30. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2012). 
 31. There have been variations on the spelling of “marijuana” over the years, 
  
newly formed body with compiling a report on the dangers of 
marijuana.32 The resulting report found that marijuana “does not 
constitute a major threat to public health,”33 and presented “little proven 
danger of physical or psychological harm.”34 Despite these findings, 
marijuana was placed into Schedule I35, reserved for substances with “a 
high potential for abuse,”36 “no currently accepted medical use in 
treatment in the United States,”37 and “a lack of accepted safety for use 
of the drug or other substance under medical supervision.”38 The CSA 
continues to remain the major legislative body regulating drug use 
today.39 
Shortly after the adoption of the CSA, President Nixon declared a 
war on drugs.40 After a plea to Congress, President Nixon successfully 
formed the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to wage his newly 
confirmed war with marijuana as a major opponent.41 
The Highs and Lows of Medical Marijuana Legislation in the 
United States 
Dating back to the 1800s, medical marijuana has experienced a 
 
appearing as “mariguan,” “marihuma,” and “mariahuana,” among others. See Alan Piper, 
The Mysterious Origins of the Word ‘Marihuana’, SINO-PLATONIC PAPERS, no. 153, July, 
2005, at 2. Congress used the common spelling “marihuana” at the time the Commission 
was established and this Note refers to the Commission and its subsequent report as it 
originally appeared but will continue to use the now common spelling of “marijuana” 
throughout the remainder of the Note. 
 32. See Slaughter, supra note 26, at 422 (describing the formation of the National 
Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse). The newly formed body became commonly 
known as the “Shafer Commission” after Raymond Shafer, the former Pennsylvania 
Governor who acted as chair. Id. 
 33. NAT’L COMM’N ON MARIHUANA & DRUG ABUSE, MARIHUANA: A SIGNAL OF 
MISUNDERSTANDING 90 (1972). 
 34. Id. at 65. But see generally C.H. Ashton, Cannabis: Dangers and Possible Uses, 
294 BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL 141, 141–42 (1987) (outlining the potential dangers of 
marijuana use). 
 35. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c)(c)(10) (2012). 
 36. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
 37. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(B) (2012). 
 38. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(c) (2012). 
 39. NEWTON, supra note 1, at 71 (“[T]he Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (CSA) . 
. . for more than four decades has provided the basic legislative framework for U.S. policy 
regarding illegal drug use.”). 
 40. Richard Nixon, President of the U.S., Remarks About an Intensified Program for 
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control (June 17, 1971) available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3047#axzz2gt7OAqIh (“I began the meeting by 
making this statement, which I think needs to be made to the Nation: America’s public 
enemy number one in the United States is drug abuse. In order to fight and defeat this 
enemy, it is necessary to wage a new, all-out offensive. I have asked the Congress to 
provide the legislative authority and the funds to fuel this kind of an offensive. This will be 
a worldwide offensive dealing with the problems of sources of supply . . . .”). 
 41. U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, DEA HISTORY IN DEPTH: 1970–
1975, at 13, available at http://www.justice.gov/dea/about/history/1970-1975.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 1, 2014) (“Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973, which becomes effective on 
July 1, 1973, among other things establishes a Drug Enforcement Administration in the 
Department of Justice.”) (emphasis in original); see also 21 U.S.C. § 812 (establishing 
marijuana as part of the CSA). 
 similarly tumultuous history in the United States.42  Medical literature 
from the early 1900s recommends using marijuana to treat a variety of 
ailments and diseases, including corns, delirium, epilepsy, impotence, 
bronchitis, menopause and whooping cough.43 As a result, marijuana 
could be found at major pharmacies throughout the United States.44 
However, once marijuana was designated as a Schedule I narcotic under 
the CSA, all uses of marijuana, including medical, were criminalized.45 
Since the federal criminalization of marijuana, the United States has 
slowly started to revisit the use of marijuana for medical purposes at the 
State level.46 The first ballot initiative was passed in 1996 by California 
and has been growing momentum ever since.47 As support for the 
growing legislation, numerous instances of individual successes can be 
cited48 along with clinical findings.49 This has resulted in reactions from 
the federal government that can be considered borderline schizophrenic 
at times.50 The United States Supreme Court, however, has remained 
 
 42. See NEWTON, supra note 1, at 36 (“The first medical conference in the United 
States devoted to the use of marijuana for medical purposes was held by the Ohio State 
Medical Society in 1860.”). 
 43. Cannabis: A Century of Medical Uses, THE ANTIQUE CANNABIS BOOK ch. 11, § 
11.1.1, http://antiquecannabisbook.com/chap11/MedUses.htm (last updated Jan., 2014) 
(providing a list of medical uses for marijuana from the turn of the century). 
 44. See NEWTON, supra note 1, at 36 (“[W]ell-known pharmaceutical companies 
made available a variety of cannabis products beginning in the second half of the 19 th 
century.”). 
 45. 21 U.S.C. 812(c)(10) (2012). 
 46. See Linda Simoni-Wastila & Francis B. Palumbo, Medical Marijuana 
Legislation: What We Know – and Don’t, 16 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 59, 59 (2013) 
(“Over the past decade . . . states . . . have adopted medical marijuana legislation . . . that 
allows citizens to register, cultivate, and/or otherwise procure marijuana for personal 
medical use.”).  
 47. Anna Wilde Mathews, Is Marijuana a Medicine?, WALL ST. J., January 18, 2010 
available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703626604575011223512854284.html 
(stating that California passed a medical marijuana initiative in 1996 and, at the time of 
print, the 14th state was primed to legalize marijuana for medical purposes with two 
additional states also considering similar legislation).  
 48. See id. (recounting the experiences of Charlene DeGidio, a Washington resident, 
who found relief for her neuropathic pain through the use of marijuana suggested by a 
doctor and Glenn Osaki who credits marijuana with being more effective and faster at 
treating pain and nausea resulting from the chemotherapy he undergoes after having his 
colon removed due to cancer; also citing a trial of 50 AIDS patients where “52% of those 
who smoked marijuana reported a 30% or greater reduction in pain.”).  
 49. See Arthur Livermore, Medical Marijuana: A Perspective, in NEWTON, supra 
note 1, at 128 (“Clinical uses of marijuana are not limited to pain reduction, appetite 
enhancement, and controlling chemotherapy induced vomiting. Cannabis protects nerve 
cells from damage and is also effective in reducing tumor growth. Multiple sclerosis 
patients use cannabis to treat peripheral neuropathy. It is effective in the treatment of 
movement disorders, glaucoma, asthma, bipolar disorder, depression, epilepsy, post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), arthritis, Parkinson’s disease, Alzheimer’s disease, 
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, alcohol abuse, insomnia, digestive diseases, gliomas, skin 
tumors, sleep apnea, and anorexia nervosa.”).  
 50. In 2009, the Department of Justice issued a federal memo stating that “federal 
resources should not be used to prosecute people whose actions are in compliance with 
state laws providing for use of medical marijuana.” See Simoni-Wastila, supra note 46, at 
66–67. Two years later, Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole issued a second memo to 
all United States Attorneys informing them that it was “likely not an efficient use of 
  
loyal to the CSA by holding that “marijuana has ‘no currently accepted 
medical use’ at all”51 and also holding that the commerce clause doesn’t 
offer a viable defense to medical marijuana.52 Despite these holdings and 
amid federal uncertainty, 20 states and the District of Columbia all 
currently have some form of medical marijuana legislation.53 
Marijuana Goes Legal 
In the face of confusion over the status of medical marijuana, some 
western states began an initiative to legalize marijuana for recreational 
use at the state level.54 During elections in November of 2012, 
Washington, Colorado, and Oregon all had the legalization of marijuana 
for commercial sale on their respective ballots.55 In both Washington and 
Colorado, the initiatives were passed and the two states hoped to generate 
substantial tax revenue via their newest commercial commodity.56 The 
only hurdle in the way was the federal ban of the substance.57 
In September of 2013, Colorado became the first state to adopt final 
rules for the new marijuana legislation.58 These rules, issued by the 
Colorado Department of Revenue’s new Marijuana Enforcement 
Division, cover topics such as licensing, business records, reporting, 
 
federal resources to focus enforcement efforts on individuals with cancer or other serious 
illnesses who use marijuana . . . .” Memorandum for United States Attorneys from James 
M. Cole, Deputy Attorney General, to all United States Attorneys (June 29, 2011). This 
same memo seemed to contradict its own guidance and the 2009 memo by also stating that 
“[p]ersons who are in the business of cultivating, selling or distributing marijuana . . . are 
in violation of the [CSA] . . . and . . . subject to federal enforcement action, including 
potential prosecution. State laws . . . are not a defense to civil or criminal enforcement of 
federal law with respect to such conduct, including enforcement of the CSA.” Id. 
 51. U.S. v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 490 (2001) (quoting 21 
U.S.C. § 812). 
 52. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 20 (2005) (stating that the CSA doesn’t 
violate the commerce clause, but rather “is squarely within Congress’ commerce power 
because production of the commodity meant for home consumption . . . has a substantial 
effect on supply and demand in the national market . . . .”).  
 53. Medical Marijuana, 20 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC: Laws, Fees, 
and Possession Limits (Sept. 16, 2013), 
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881.   
 54. Jonathan J. Cooper & Kristen Wyatt, Legalize Pot Vote Coming Up In 3 States 
(Sept. 19, 2012) available at http://www.nbcnews.com/id/49092106/ns/us_news-
life/t/legalize-pot-vote-coming-states/ (stating that Washington, Colorado and Oregon are 
all putting forth ballot initiatives that would legalize the recreational use of marijuana).  
 55. Brian A. Shactman, Washington State, Colorado Vote Yes to Legalizing 
Marijuana (Nov. 7, 2012) available at http://www.cnbc.com/id/49729596.  
 56. Id. (describing Colorado’s belief that the state would be able to generate $40 
million a year from the taxation of marijuana which it would then put into the public 
school system). 
 57. See id. (explaining the uncertainty felt in both Colorado and Washington 
resulting from the inconsistent enforcement of federal marijuana laws as they pertain to 
medical marijuana at the state level). 
 58. John Ingold, Colorado First State in Country to Finalize Rules for Recreational 
Pot, THE DENVER POST, Sept. 10, 2013 available at 
http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_24062676/colorado-first-state-country-
finalize-rules-recreational-pot (describing the release of a 136 page document laying out 
Colorado’s agreed upon final rules governing recreational marijuana businesses on Sept. 9, 
2013).  
 labeling, product safety, and advertising.59 On December 6, 2013, 
Washington adopted their final rules which mirror many of Colorado’s 
rules.60  
As Colorado and Washington began to draft rules regulating the 
newly passed marijuana legislation, the rest of the nation speculated over 
what the federal response would be.61 Ten months after the initiatives 
were passed, speculation was quiet as Deputy Attorney General Cole 
issued a formal memorandum to United States Attorneys across the 
nation.62 At the onset, Mr. Cole made clear that “Congress has 
determined that marijuana is a dangerous drug and that the illegal 
distribution and sale of marijuana is a serious crime . . . . The Department 
of Justice is committed to enforcement of the CSA consistent with those 
determinations.”63 The four-page memo proceeded to outline current 
federal priorities in regards to marijuana enforcement.64 The memo then 
addressed the burning question of whether the federal government would 
take action, stating that “[i]n jurisdictions that have enacted laws 
legalizing marijuana in some form and that have also implemented strong 
and effective regulatory and enforcement systems . . . . enforcement of 
state law by state and local law enforcement and regulatory bodies should 
remain the primary means of addressing marijuana-related activity.”65 
Specifically addressing the issue of prosecution, the memo instructed 
prosecutors to disregard both the size and/or commercial nature of an 
enterprise, and instead look to “whether the operation is demonstrably in 
compliance with a strong and effective state regulatory system.”66 The 
federal government had officially taken their stance, and Colorado and 
 
 59. See Statement of Adoption from Barbara J. Brohl, Executive Director and State 
Licensing Authority, to Ron Kammerzell, Senior Director of Enforcement (Sept. 9, 2013) 
(listing the new permanent rules regarding recreational marijuana).  
 60. See generally Chapter 314-55 WAC: Marijuana Licenses, Application Process, 
Requirements, and Reporting, Doc. No. OTS-5501.4 (setting requirements for cultivating 
marijuana for sale, minimum records a marijuana retailer must maintain, monthly reports 
retailers must file, minimum and maximum serving sizes, packaging and labeling 
requirements, changes in ownership, business name, or location, and advertising). 
 61. See Alex Kreit, The Federal Response to State Marijuana Legalization: Room 
for Compromise?, 91 Or. L. Rev. 1029, 1030 (2012-2013) (outlining the various 
hypotheses, ranging from the federal government attempting to block the law through the 
courts to allowing Colorado and Washington to pursue their legislation uninterrupted).  
 62. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney General, to all United 
States Attorneys (Aug. 29, 2013). 
 63. Id. at 1.  
 64. Id. at 1–2 (listing the eight priorities as “[1] Preventing the distribution of 
marijuana to minors; [2] Preventing revenue from the sale of marijuana from going to 
criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels; [3] Preventing the diversion of marijuana from 
states where it is legal under state law in some form to other states; [4] Preventing state-
authorized marijuana activity from being used as a cover or pretext for the trafficking of 
other illegal drugs or other illegal activity; [5] Preventing violence and the use of firearms 
in the cultivation and distribution of marijuana; [6] Preventing drugged driving and the 
exacerbation of other adverse public health consequences associated with marijuana use; 
[7] Preventing the growing of marijuana on public lands and the attendant public safety 
and environmental dangers posed by marijuana production on public lands; and [8] 
Preventing marijuana possession or use on federal property.”).  
 65. Id. at 3.  
 66. Id.  
  
Washington could seemingly proceed with their new legislation.67 
C. International Legislation 
The Inception of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 
While the United States established a war against marijuana starting 
in the 1930’s and culminating with Nixon’s declaration of a ‘war on 
drugs’, the international community was also setting boundaries.68 
Although there were numerous international conventions addressing 
drugs,69 the most influential treaty was adopted in 1961: the United 
Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (“Single Convention”).70 
The Single Convention was the result of years of preparation by the 
United Nations, culminating in an international meeting where 
representatives from 73 nations shared growing concerns surrounding 
narcotics at the United Nations Headquarters in New York.71 The result 
was an international treaty signed by 61 countries which replaced nine 
multilateral drug treaties from 1912 on.72  
The Single Convention was adopted with the goal of limiting 
designated drugs exclusively to medical and scientific uses.73 By dividing 
drugs into one of four Schedules, the treaty lays out unique controls for 
different drugs.74 Marijuana can be found in both Schedule I and 
Schedule IV, which the treaty reserves for the most dangerous drugs.75 
 
 67. See generally id. (expressing the view that the federal government would allow 
states to construct their own marijuana legislation, regulation and enforcement).  
 68. See United Nations Secretariat, The Drug Abuse Problem: International Policy, 
34 INT’L REV. CRIM. POL’Y 43, 43 (1978) (recounting the evolution of international drug 
policy from 1909 through 1972. In 1909, the Shanghai Conference included 13 countries 
and addressed the growing opium problem. By 1972, there were approximately 100 
countries discussing hundreds of natural and synthetic drugs).   
 69. See generally United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Chronology: 100 
Years of Drug Control (providing an overview of international drug control from 1909 
through 2008). 
 70. See generally Single Convention, supra note 5. 
 71. See Robert W. Gregg, The Politics of International Drug Control, 49 A.B.A. J. 
176, 176–77 (1963) (stating that 73 nations attended the Conference); see also U.N.T.S., 
Chapter VI Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs available at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no=VI-
15&chapter=6&lang=en [hereinafter Chapter VI] (describing the date and location of the 
Conference). 
 72. Single Convention, supra note 5, at art. 44(1) (listing the nine treaties terminated 
by The Single Convention); see also Chapter VI, supra note 71 (stating that 61 countries 
originally signed the Single Convention).  
 73. Single Convention, supra note 5, at Preamble (“[r]ecognizing that addiction to 
narcotic drugs constitutes a serious evil . . . [c]onscious of [the] duty to prevent and 
combat this evil, . . . [d]esir[e] to conclude a generally acceptable international convention 
. . . limiting such drugs to medical and scientific use, and providing for continuous 
international co-operation and control for the achievement of such aims and objectives . . 
.”). 
 74. See id. at art. 2 (establishing and describing Schedules I—IV). 
 75. Id. at 26, 30 (listing the drugs placed into Schedule I and Schedule IV, 
respectively); see also id. at art. 2(5) (“The drugs in Schedule IV shall also be included in 
Schedule I and subject to all measures of control applicable to drugs in the latter Schedule, 
and in addition thereto: a) A Party shall adopt any special measures of control which in its 
opinion are necessary having regard to the particularly dangerous properties of a drug so 
included;”).  
 By strategically placing marijuana in Schedule I, the Single Convention 
establishes that it is “particularly liable to abuse and to produce ill 
effects . . . and that such liability is not offset by substantial therapeutic 
advantages.”76 
By becoming a party to the Single Convention, governments take on 
specific established obligations.77 These obligations require that States 
“limit exclusively to medical and scientific purposes the production, 
manufacture, export, import, distribution of, trade in, use and possession 
of drugs.”78 The Single Convention also lays out guidelines pertaining to 
punishment, stating that each adopting country will implement adequate 
punishments, with the recommendation of imprisonment, for intentional 
violations.79 Marijuana is afforded its own article, in which the Single 
Convention mandates that in addition to the already established 
obligations, “[t]he Parties shall adopt such measures as may be necessary 
to prevent the misuse of, and illicit traffic in, the leaves of the cannabis 
plant.”80 
In order to ensure compliance with the Single Convention, the 
International Narcotics Control Board (“the Board”) and the Commission 
on Narcotic Drugs of the Economic and Social Council (“the 
Commission”) were established.81 The Commission is entrusted with 
maintaining the Single Convention, including amending the Schedules 
and providing recommendations for scientific research.82 The Single 
Convention provides the Board with specific powers in order to secure 
compliance should the Single Convention’s goals become threatened.83 
In 1961, the United States decided not to sign the Single Convention 
due to “a last-minute move to dilute the strength of some of the 
prohibitions . . . .”84 However, Harry Anslinger, motivated by the influx 
of marijuana use on college campuses, called for Senate support of the 
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 79. See id. at art. 36(1)(a), p.18 (listing “cultivation, production, manufacture, 
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 80. Id. at art. 28(3).  
 81. Single Convention, supra note 5, at art. 5.  
 82. Id. at art. 8 (providing general guidance on the Commission’s role).  
 83. See generally id. at art. 14 (describing the means with which the Board may 
secure treaty compliance). In the event that there has been a potential violation of the 
treaty, the Board may begin attempts to gain compliance with private consultations with 
the government in breach, progressing to a request that remedial measures be adopted by 
the government in question. If compliance is not obtained, the Board may, for assessment 
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remedies prove to be unsuccessful, the Board may involve other parties to the treaty, 
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 84. SLOMAN, supra note 3, at 226.  
  
treaty in 1967.85 Mr. Anslinger met no opposition before the Foreign 
Relations Committee, and “the treaty passed the Senate by a vote of 84 to 
0.”86 As a result, on May 25, 1967, the United States became a party to 
the Single Convention.87 
The Board’s Backlash to Washington and Colorado 
As a party to the Single Convention, the Board took a strong interest 
in the progression of state legislation legalizing marijuana in Washington 
and Colorado. In March, 2013, the President of the Board stressed that 
“the 1961 Convention limits the licit use of narcotic drugs – including 
cannabis – to medical and scientific purposes.”88 The President of the 
INCB’s position requires that he “monitor the implementation of the 
three international drug control conventions.”89 In keeping with this 
mandate, the President explained that “the 1961 Convention . . . needs to 
be implemented worldwide, on the national level, but also on the sub-
national level.”90 A formal request was issued for “the Government of the 
United States [to] take effective measures to ensure the implementation 
of all control measures for cannabis plants and cannabis, as required 
under the 1961 Convention, in all states and territories falling within its 
legislative authority.”91 By distributing the Deputy Attorney General’s 
memo stating that as long as states enacted strong regulatory systems in 
distributing marijuana, the federal government would not intervene, the 
United States seemed to be disregarding the Board’s guidance that had 
been urged six months earlier.92  
iii.International Movement Towards Legalization 
Meanwhile, the United States hasn’t been the only country 
pioneering marijuana legalization.93 In late July, 2013, Uruguay’s “lower 
 
 85. Id. at 227 (“’Another important reason for becoming a party to the 1961 
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specific that we must prevent its misuse. If the United States becomes a party to the 1961 
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Foreign Relations Committee, April 27, 1967)).  
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 87. See Chapter VI, supra note 71 (listing May 25, 1967 as the date of accession for 
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 88. Raymond Yans, President, International Narcotics Control Board, Report of the 
International Narcotics Control Board, at 7 (Mar. 11–15, 2013) (emphasis in original).  
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obligations).  
 93. See James P. Gray, Our Top Ten Drug Policy Goals, 91 Or. L. Rev. 1327, 1335 
(2013) (stating that Mexico, Uruguay and Guatemala are all discussing national marijuana 
legislation); see also Daniel Robelo, Demand Reduction or Redirection? Channeling Illicit 
Drug Demand Towards a Regulated Supply to Diminish Violence in Latin America, 91 Or. 
 house passed a marijuana legalization bill . . . bringing the South 
American nation one step closer to becoming the first to legally regulate 
production, distribution and sale of the drug.94 Upon House approval, the 
bill was considered by the Senate, which passed the final bill on 
December 10, 2013.95 After the bill passed both the House and Senate, 
President Jose Mujica signed the bill into law on December 23, 2013, 
making Uruguay the first nation in the world to legalize marijuana. 96   
Uruguay’s new law authorizes citizens over 18 to harvest their own 
marijuana plants, with a maximum of six plants and personal use up to 40 
grams.97 Licensed pharmacies will be the only entities permitted to sell 
marijuana to the public, with sales anticipated to commence as early as 
April of 2014.98 Regulatory bodies, including the National Institute of 
Cannabis, will be tasked with ensuring compliance with the Bill’s 
regulations.99 The National Integrated Health System will be charged 
with promoting health and preventing cannabis abuse.100 
The INCB attempted to intervene and stop Uruguay’s attempt to 
legalize marijuana during the early stages of the process.101 However, 
Uruguay resisted the involvement of the INCB, declining a meeting with 
the international body before the House began deliberations.102 The 
INCB continued to “urge[] the Uruguayan authorities to ensure that the 
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weeks following the passage of Colorado and Washington’s initiatives as a means for 
controlling the drug-related violence in Mexico). 
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U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Dec. 26, 2013), 
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 97. See Proyecto de Ley sobre Canabis 2012 [Cannabis Bill 2012], Azamblea 
General de la Republica de Uruguay [General Assembly of the Republic of Uruguay], 
ArtÍculo 4, 3 (2012) (Uru.), available at http://medios.presidencia.gub.uy/jm 
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 98. Nelson, supra note 95. 
 99. See Cannabis Bill 2012, supra note 97, at TÍtulo III [Title 3]. 
 100. See id. at ArtÍculo 7 [Article 7].  
 101. U.N. International Narcotics Control Board, supra note 91, at ¶513 (“The Board 
noted with concern that in August 2012, the Government of Uruguay presented to its 
national congress a proposed law to legalize the production and sale of cannabis in the 
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and distributing cannabis herb and its derivatives. If adopted, the law could be in 
contravention of the international drug control conventions to which Uruguay is a party. 
The Board, in line with its mandate, has sought a dialogue with the Government of 
Uruguay to promote the country’s compliance with the provisions of the international drug 
control treaties, in particular the 1961 Convention.”). 
 102. See U.N. Information Service, INCB President Urges Uruguay to Remain Within 
the International Drug Control Treaties, Noting Draft Cannabis Legislation, U.N. Doc. 
UNIS/NAR/1176 (Aug. 1, 2013) (“The Board regrets that the Government of Uruguay 
refused to receive an INCB mission before the draft law was submitted to Parliament for 
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country remains fully compliant with international law . . . “103 and 
reminded them that “the draft legislation, if adopted, might have serious 
consequences for the health and welfare of the population . . . .”104 The 
INCB insinuated that there might be repercussions if the legislation were 
ultimately passed, but failed to elaborate on what exactly those 
repercussions would be.105  
When the Uruguayan Senate approved the bill, INCB President 
Raymond Yans accused the Uruguayan government of ignoring 
“negative impacts on health”106 as well as “available scientific evidence, 
including that presented to the parliamentary committees by Uruguay’s 
own scientific community.”107 He also predicted that Uruguay’s newest 
law will negatively affect the nation’s youth in particular, by 
“encouraging early experimentation . . . and thus contributing to 
developmental problems and earlier onset of addiction and other 
disorders.”108 Noticeably absent from the statement released by the INCB 
was any mention of tangible repercussions for Uruguay’s breach of the 
Single Convention; rather the international body simply “reiterate[d] its 
call to the Government of Uruguay to engage with the Board with a view 
to ensure that Uruguay continues to respect and implement the treaties to 
which it is a Party.”109 
While Uruguay has been making headlines, the Netherlands have 
been quietly enjoying marijuana for decades.110 During the mid-1970’s, 
in an effort to minimize heroin use, the Netherlands adopted a 
decriminalization policy towards marijuana, with the belief that 
marijuana would provide a less harmful alternative to more destructive 
drugs.111 As a party to the Single Convention, the Dutch government 
maintained marijuana’s status as an illegal substance but simply refused 
to prosecute violations, a practice still in effect today.112 
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commitment to the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, but the Dutch 
Ministry of Justice simply chose not to enforce the law against marijuana”); see also Kurt 
V. Laker, Smoke and Mirrors: The Self-Examination of Canadian Marijuana Policy in the 
 In addition to decriminalizing marijuana, the Netherlands also 
tolerate “coffee shops” which sell marijuana commercially.113 Assuming 
the coffee shops follow a few well established rules, they are left alone 
by law enforcement and can run a profitable business.114 The acceptance 
of coffee shops allows marijuana users a safe environment in which to 
purchase the substance without risking exposure to increasingly 
dangerous drugs at the hands of street-level dealers.115 
In contrast to the strong urging the INCB has directed towards 
Uruguay, the INCB has been relatively quiet about the decriminalization 
of marijuana in the Netherlands.116 Meanwhile, the Netherlands has 
overtly challenged the INCB, saying that “. . . the INCB has a role to play 
in further stimulating evidence-based approaches . . .”117 and that there is 
a “necessity [for] a flexible approach.”118 The Netherlands has suggested 
that their country’s decriminalization of marijuana is one of the “new, 
innovative and effective measures to reverse the adverse consequences of 
drug use and reduce drug-related harm”119 and that the coffee shops have 
“had a positive impact on the health and wellbeing in the 
Netherlands.”120 
D.Interpreting International Treaties 
Article VI of the Constitution of the United States says that treaties 
are “the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby . . .”121 Exactly what that means can be confusing. In 
1829, the Supreme Court of the United States (“the Court”) held that a 
treaty by itself was not a legislative act carrying immediate effect upon 
the parties involved and their territories.122 Rather, the Court stated, a 
treaty “is carried into execution by the sovereign power of the respective 
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parties to the instrument.”123 This concept is referred to as a treaty being 
“non-self-executing.”124 When courts are permitted to rely on a treaty 
without any accompanying legislation, the treaty is thought to be “self-
executing.”125 The Supreme Court has confirmed these categories of 
treaties by explaining that “while treaties ‘may comprise international 
commitments . . . they are not domestic law unless Congress has either 
enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention 
that it be ‘self-executing’ and is ratified on these terms.’”126 
Whether a treaty is considered to be non-self-executing or self-
executing depends on numerous factors. The specificity with which the 
treaty was written may be looked to, as well as the country interpreting 
the treaty.127 In the United States, the President and Senate alone hold 
treaty-making power, which forces the courts to tread carefully when 
interpreting treaties so as not to run the risk of legislating.128 At the state 
level, “courts have imposed quite rigorous requirement in many cases, 
suggesting a veiled attempt at limiting treaty application in United States 
courts.”129 
The Current and Future Relationship Between  the United States, 
The Single Convention and Marijuana 
Why the United States is in Violation of The Single Convention  
At the time of accession to a treaty, a state may propose a 
reservation that their accession is contingent upon.130 There is also an 
opportunity upon accession for parties to provide optional declarations 
which “allow States . . .  to assume additional or different commitments 
on joining the treaty than those they would have absent a declaration.”131 
In 1967, the United States became a party to the Single Convention with 
no reservations or declarations, thus agreeing to be bound by the treaty as 
it was written.132  
 
 123. Id.  
 124. Thomas Michael McDonnell, Defensively Invoking Treaties in American Courts 
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 127. See McDonnell, supra note 124124, at 1405, 1424 (stating that international 
treaties give rise to an international obligation but that the means with which each country 
fulfills that obligation are the responsibility of the individual country; courts look for 
specific treaty language in deciding whether the treaty is self-executing or non-self-
executing).  
 128. Id. at 1424. 
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 132. See Chapter VI, supra note 71 71 (showing the United States’ accession in 1967 
 Through accession without any reservations or declarations, the 
United States agreed to be bound by the entirety of the Single 
Convention.133 Thus, the United States has committed itself to 
criminalizing the use of narcotics, including marijuana, outside of the 
medical and scientific fields.134 By legalizing marijuana for recreational 
use and commercial sale, outside the scope of approved uses the treaty 
specifies, both Colorado and Washington clearly placed the United States 
in violation of the Single Convention.  This violation has not gone 
unnoticed, with the President of the Board reasserting that “the United 
States has a treaty obligation to ensure the implementation of the treaties 
on the entirety of its territory.”135 
Arguing that the treaty was not self-executing and therefore needed 
to be adopted through domestic legislation does not provide the United 
States with an exemption to its obligations under the Single Convention. 
The Court has confirmed that unless a treaty contains language which 
signifies it to be ‘self-executing’, treaties are not regarded as national law 
until Congress has “‘enacted implementing statutes.’”136 Assuming the 
Single Convention to be a ‘non-self-executing’ treaty, Congress would 
have to adopt at least one statute in order for the treaty to have full effect 
in the domestic legal system.  
Three years after becoming a party to the Single Convention, 
Congress passed the CSA which fully adopt the Single Convention into 
domestic law.137 The CSA was enacted to “conquer drug abuse and to 
control the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances.”138 
Several provisions were “adopted to effectuate [the United States’] treaty 
obligations under Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs”139 and Congress 
made mention of the Single Convention throughout the legislation.140 By 
executing the treaty into the United States’ legal system vis-à-vis the 
CSA, all obligations the United States assumed by becoming a party to 
the treaty were realized.  
Options for “Fixing” the United States’ Treaty Violation 
Too Late to Make a Reservation 
When becoming party to a treaty, there exists an option to make “a 
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unilateral statement . . . whereby it purports to exclude or modify the 
legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that 
state.”141 This option is known as a reservation which allows a state to 
“fine-tune or adjust the way in which a multilateral treaty will apply to 
it.”142 In relation to the Single Convention, at least three countries entered 
into reservations stating that the use of marijuana would be permitted 
within their territories for non-medical or scientific purposes; the United 
States was not one of them.143  
Initial logic would hold that the United States could simply enter 
into a reservation now permitting the use of marijuana for recreational 
purposes. However, the Single Convention expressly prohibits the 
statement of reservations following initial accession to the treaty, stating 
that reservations may be made “at the time of signature, ratification or 
accession.”144 By not stating a reservation pertaining to marijuana at the 
time of accession, the United States was barred from doing so in the 
future.145 Thus, a reservation permitting the use of recreational marijuana 
is not a feasible means of avoiding the obligations under the Single 
Convention.  
ii.  Why Withdraw Isn’t Worth It 
Another option is to withdraw from the Single Convention 
altogether, thus leaving the treaty intact but removing any legal 
obligations formed on behalf of the United States.146 The process of 
withdraw, referred to as denunciation in the Single Convention, simply 
calls for a written statement to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations.147 The withdrawing party will then be relieved of all obligations 
no later than six months following receipt of the statement by the 
Secretary-General.148  
Withdraw, or denunciation, is always an option but does not “affect 
any right, obligation or legal situation of the parties created through the 
execution of the treaty prior to its termination.”149 Thus, the United States 
would remain responsible for the current breach emanating from 
Washington and Colorado despite a potential decision to withdraw.150 
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 Withdraw also carries with it certain negative consequences, such as 
international isolation, trade sanctions, removal of financial assistance 
and a damaged reputation.151 By recently withdrawing from, or failing to 
ratify, at least 10 treaties, the United States has already “cast doubt on its 
commitment to multilateral cooperation.”152 As withdraw is not a feasible 
means to circumvent accountability for the current violation, the potential 
ramifications of withdraw from the Single Convention outweigh any 
benefits. 
iii. Amending the Single Convention is the Best Option 
In light of the newly passed legislation within the United States 
concerning recreational marijuana and proposed legislation in the 
international community, the best means of aligning the Single 
Convention with evolving norms is to amend the treaty.153 Amendments 
allow for formal changes to be made to a treaty while maintaining the 
treaty’s existence.154 This allows for adjustment as “parties’ 
understanding of the issue”155 change or circumstances surrounding the 
issue change without requiring the drafting of a new treaty or termination 
of an existing one. By amending the Single Convention to allow for the 
recreational use of marijuana, the United States and other countries 
considering such legislation would be able to continue the legislative 
process without any international obligations impeding the progression 
towards marijuana legalization.  
Article 47 within the Single Convention provides instructions for 
amending the treaty, stating that “[a]ny [p]arty may propose an 
amendment to this Convention.”156 In order to make such a proposal, the 
amendment itself and the reasons behind the amendment must be 
transferred to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in writing who 
will then disseminate the proposed amendment to the other parties of the 
treaty and the Commission. At this point, the Commission has the power 
to decide if a conference should be held to discuss the proposal or if the 
parties should simply be asked if they are willing to accept.157 If there is 
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no objection within 18 months, the amendment becomes fully adopted; if 
there is an objection, the Commission may then choose to hold a 
conference to review the proposal.158 
With 153 current parties to the Single Convention, arriving at a 
consensus may prove difficult. This does not preclude the option to 
amend as “amendments require agreement between treaty parties, but not 
necessarily between all parties.” Once an amendment has been proposed 
and adopted, parties are free to decide if they will become a party to the 
amendment.159 Those who opt not to join the amendment remain bound 
by the treaty’s original obligations.160 By proposing an amendment that 
would permit the use of marijuana for recreational purposes, those 
countries who wish to pursue such legislation would be permitted to do 
so and those countries who remain in opposition would be able to remain 
parties to the original treaty preventing the use of recreational 
marijuana.161  
Support for Legalization Within the United States from a Policy 
Standpoint 
The need for amendment is evident as numerous countries move 
towards marijuana legalization.162 Within the United States, a movement 
towards federal legalization is desirable for numerous reasons. 
Particularly, legalization would increase tax revenues, lower drug use 
rates while also lowering the rate of international violence.  
Marijuana is Costing Taxpayers Money 
The United States has one of the busiest criminal justice systems in 
the world, resulting in and estimated 12.2 million arrests in 2012 
alone.163  Of these arrests, 1,552,432 were for drug abuse violations with 
almost half for marijuana related crimes.164 The money spent, on a 
national level, for this level of enforcement of marijuana laws alone is up 
to $7.7 billion a year.165 
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 The excessive spending for the enforcement of marijuana 
prohibition is not only costing taxpayers, but it’s also taking away from 
potential tax revenue. “[I]f it were taxed similarly to alcohol and tobacco, 
marijuana would provide $6.2 billion in additional revenue each 
year . . . .”166 The potential for generated revenue, coupled with savings 
gained by no longer having the necessity for strict enforcement of 
marijuana prohibition could potentially amount to an “annual budget 
increase of nearly $14 billion.”167 
In order to identify where some of these saving would be coming 
from, it’s important to take a closer look at spending within the federal 
prison system.  There are well over 200,000 inmates incarcerated at the 
federal level; 51% of those inmates’ most serious charge is a drug 
offense.168 Depending on the level of security they’re housed in, each 
inmate costs the federal government between $21,000 and $33,000 a 
year. This kind of expenditure led to the Obama administration having 
“‘to request $6.9 billion for the Bureau of Prisons in fiscal [year] 
2013.’”169 The expensive reality doesn’t stop there, “[f]ederal prison 
costs are expected to rise to 30 percent of the Department of Justice’s 
budget by 2020.”170 
The potential savings to not only taxpayers but also to the criminal 
justice system by essentially eliminating the prohibition on marijuana171 
can be better illustrated through comparisons to the Netherlands, where 
marijuana has been decriminalized since the 1970s. For instance, in 2009, 
the United States incarcerated 743 people for every 100,000. In 2010, the 
Netherlands incarcerated 94 people for every 100,000.172 While prison 
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populations fluctuate from year to year and are impacted by numerous 
factors173, the stark difference in incarceration rates between the 
Netherlands and the United States is hard to ignore. On the expense side 
of things, the Netherlands spends approximately $307 per capita on their 
criminal justice system while the United States spends approximately 
$552.174 By adopting federal legislation similar to that of Washington and 
Colorado, the federal government would be lightening the current load on 
the prison system while simultaneously generating revenue.  
The Status of Marijuana as an Illegal Substance Has No Deterrent 
Effect  
Proponents of maintaining marijuana as an illegal substance claim 
that social stigmas associated with breaking the law will prevent 
individuals from experimenting with and using marijuana.175 However, 
there is no empirical evidence to support this claim. Recent figures show 
that in the United States, despite marijuana legislation, high school aged 
children who view smoking marijuana as risky behavior has steadily 
declined since the early 90’s.176 Although marijuana laws have been in 
effect for over 70 years, there is further evidence of increasing 
acceptance of the substance with fifty-eight percent of the population 
believing marijuana should be legal.177  
Marijuana usage among the population as a whole also shows that 
marijuana laws have no deterrent effect within the United States. In 2012, 
7.6 million people over the age of 12 reported using marijuana 20 or 
more days a month, up from 4.8 million in 2002.178 There has also been a 
rise in the number of individuals who use marijuana 300 or more days a 
year from 3.1 million in 2002 to 5.4 million in 2012.179 These figures 
continue to rise despite an increase in marijuana enforcement. Between 
1996 and 2006, there were nine million arrests for marijuana violations. 
Despite these arrests and their alleged deterrent effect, 25 million people 
used marijuana in 2007.180  
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 Growing public acceptance of marijuana in the United States is 
evident beyond the realm of private use. In 1987, Judge Douglas 
Ginsburg was nominated for a seat on the United States Supreme Court 
by then President Ronald Reagan. Nine days after his nomination, Judge 
Ginsburg withdrew his name after receiving backlash for his prior 
marijuana use.181 Four years later, then President George H. W. Bush 
nominated Judge Clarence Thomas. When it became public that Judge 
Thomas had previously smoked marijuana, President Bush stated that it 
was not an issue that warranted disqualification.182 Shortly after, Senator 
Bill Clinton admitted to marijuana experimentation and was later elected 
as the successor to George H. W. Bush as President of the United 
States.183 Public acceptance of marijuana in the United States has become 
so widespread that for the last 16 years the public has chosen as its 
President an admitted prior marijuana user.184 
Legalization May Decrease Overall Drug Use 
There is a great deal of speculation as to the effects marijuana 
legalization would have, but the best indication is to look to the 
Netherlands where marijuana has been decriminalized since 1976.185 
Following the adoption of decriminalization, marijuana use in the 
Netherlands actually declined and has since stabilized with no tangible 
increase or decrease in use.186 More importantly, by providing an 
alternative means of obtaining marijuana, the Netherlands has 
successfully isolated casual marijuana users to the ‘coffee shops’ found 
throughout the country “‘where it is as absurd to ask for hard drugs as it 
is at an average butcher’s [shop] to ask for a zebra-steak.”187 By 
preventing exposure to drug dealers peddling ‘hard drugs,’188 
decriminalization successfully decreased the demand for harder drugs, 
particularly heroin, because users were no longer being introduced to 
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‘hard drugs’ by the dealers they previously had to associate with in order 
to purchase marijuana.189  
U.S. Legalization Would Reduce Violence on an International Level 
The black market for marijuana in the United States has led to the 
formation of drug cartels in Mexico. The cartels smuggle marijuana into 
the United States and the proceeds from the sale are then smuggled back 
into Mexico where they account for over sixty percent of the cartels 
overall revenue.190 Without any legal avenues for settling disputes among 
rival cartels, they are ultimately pitted against each other in a violent 
fight for control over territory, smuggling routes and cities along the 
border between the United States and Mexico.191 The resulting violence 
has caused approximately “60,000 drug-related murders since . . . 
2006.”192 In 2011, Mexico’s former President, Vicente Fox, explained 
that “‘[t]he drug consumer in the U.S. yields billions of dollars, money 
that goes back to Mexico to bribe police and money that buys guns . . . . 
So when you question yourselves about what is going on in Mexico, it 
depends very much on what happens in this nation.’”193 By not forcing 
marijuana producers underground, the United States could substantially 
alleviate the violence in Mexico.194  
Conclusion  
Colorado and Washington took a leap of faith in approving the use 
of marijuana for recreational purposes despite conflicting federal law. 
The United States signaled a potential shift in its perspective by publicly 
condoning the new legislation. The United States is not alone; the 
international community has shown an increased approval, and in some 
instances outright support, of recreational marijuana. This growing 
international support warrants an amendment to the Single Convention in 
order to allow states to legislate recreational marijuana as they see fit 
without the constraints of international obligations.  
Amending the Single Convention would allow the United States to 
pursue federal legislation similar to that of Colorado and Washington. By 
legalizing marijuana on the federal level, the United States would see 
positive gains both domestically and internationally.  The United States 
would stand to gain significant revenue while simultaneously decreasing 
its prison population and international violence. Such potentially 
significant ramifications warrant an amendment to the Single Convention 
in order to permit states to weigh these benefits in their own territories 
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 without being held hostage by an international treaty that’s no longer in 
line with popular opinion. 
 
